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Abstract  
 
Sri Lanka’s 26-year civil war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam came to a bloody end in May 2009, amidst allegations of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity on both sides. Since then, Tamils in 
the diaspora, long accused of funding the war, have become vocal 
proponents for war crimes accountability. Some might label certain forms 
of diaspora advocacy as “lawfare” or “long-distance nationalism.” 
However, these labels fail to account for the complex memories and 
identities that shape diaspora advocacy for accountability today. In order 
for Sri Lanka to move forward from decades of conflict, transitional 
justice mechanisms to seek truth, pursue justice, and provide redress will 
need to address collective memories of violence. Inclusive transitional 
justice mechanisms could incorporate a diaspora component to vindicate 
the rights of diaspora Tamils as victims to truth and redress under 
international law. Ultimately, opening the door to diverse narratives, 
including competing narratives within the Tamil diaspora, could serve as 
a starting point to come to terms with the past and explore hopes for a 
shared future. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Accountability for mass violence is political, even for societies decades removed 
from conflict.1  Political dimensions become more pronounced in a globalized world as 
non-state actors increasingly lobby international organizations for accountability.   
Conflict-generated diasporas, including Tamils, Irish, Kurds, Armenians, Liberians, and 
others, are now able to serve as vocal transnational advocates, shaping post-conflict 
transitional justice agendas.   While these new roles may help broker peace, scholars have 
also questioned whether conflict-generated diaspora groups, motivated by identity 
politics, may play a destabilizing role.   
This article takes a closer look at Tamil diaspora advocacy for war crimes 
accountability in Sri Lanka to explore why certain diaspora voices for accountability 
seem to diverge from international human rights organizations also pursuing 
accountability.  While some would conclude that certain diaspora actors engage in 
“lawfare” or “long-distance nationalism,” this article argues that such assessments fail to 
evaluate the complex memories, collective identities, and myths that shape diaspora 
advocacy today.   Rather than exclude diaspora Tamils with “separatist” views, it may be 
worth considering whether their narratives could be incorporated within an inclusive 
transitional justice framework.  Truth commissions, commemorations, reparations, public 
                                                 
1
 Case in point: the recent trial of General José Efraín Ríos Montt in Guatemala pitched those who insisted 
that there had been genocide against those who denied it.  Lisa J.  Laplante, Memory Battles: Guatemala’s 
Public Debates and the Genocide Trial of Jose Efrain Rios Montt, 32 Quinnipiac L.  Rev.  621, 646 (2014).  
The genocide-deniers (¡No hubo genocidio!) asserted that the Guatemalan government was fighting 
“terrorist” guerillas in the early 1980s.  Id.  at 649-52.  Their opponents (¡Sí, hubo genocidio!) cited 
massacres of Mayan villages and military policy manuals as evidence of a government campaign to target 
and eliminate Mayan civilians.  Id.  at 647-49. 
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apologies, and prosecutions of historic crimes could serve to acknowledge the trauma and 
legitimate grievances that led a quarter of Sri Lanka’s Tamils to seek refuge abroad.   
While this effort is not without challenges, the Sri Lankan government could evaluate 
creative approaches to acknowledge diverse diaspora memories of violence, 
marginalization, and displacement as it comes to terms with its past. 
This article is divided into six parts.  Section II provides background on the post-
war push for accountability in Sri Lanka, with an extended discussion of advocacy by 
“hardline” diaspora Tamil groups before the UNHRC in March 2014.  This section also 
highlights diversity among diaspora groups in pursuing accountability.  Section III asks 
whether accountability lobbying by hardline groups should be interpreted as “lawfare” or 
“long-distance nationalism.” Concluding that both of these labels dehumanize diaspora 
experiences and fail to provide a path forward, Section IV argues that a deeper analysis is 
necessary to understand the unique trauma and identities that shape diaspora Tamil 
advocacy today.  Section V outlines possibilities and challenges for incorporating 
diaspora Tamil narratives into an inclusive transitional justice framework, exploring ways 
in which diverse diaspora voices can be incorporated in mechanisms to seek truth, 
provide redress, and pursue justice.  Section VI concludes by suggesting that diaspora 
engagement will be important for Sri Lanka to come to terms with the past, though such 
an undertaking is not without challenges.   
Without advocating a particular course of action, this article suggests that it may 
be possible to develop an inclusive transitional justice framework that acknowledges 
diverse narratives, including those advocating a “political” accountability agenda, 
without whitewashing serious human rights violations by any one side of the conflict.   
 
II. Background 
 
In May 2009, Sri Lankan government forces defeated the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE, sometimes called the “Tamil Tigers”), ending twenty-six years of 
civil war.  In the years since the war’s end, many diaspora Tamils, alongside human 
rights organizations and several states, have advocated for war crimes accountability.  
Citing a lack of domestic progress, accountability proponents called for an international 
investigation of the last stages of the war.  In March 2014, these calls were answered 
when the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a resolution creating a 
U.N. inquiry to investigate crimes on both sides of the conflict.2  
During UNHRC negotiations in Geneva, interesting divisions emerged among 
those on the same side of the accountability debate.  Some diaspora Tamils objected to 
the resolution drafted by the United States and the United Kingdom.  They argued that 
addressing impunity and strengthening the rule of law island-wide, as the resolution 
sought to do, would merely legitimize a racist Sri Lankan state without alleviating 
problems faced by Tamils.  Some diaspora Tamils sought a resolution that would 
recognize claims to Tamil nationhood, while many human rights organizations and the 
U.S. and U.K. distanced themselves from such views.    
 
                                                 
2
 U.N.  Human Rights Council, Res.  25/1, A/HRC/25/L.1/Rev.1, (Mar.  27, 2014).    
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A. Post-War Push for Accountability in Sri Lanka 
 
In May 2009, President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared victory over the LTTE, 
framing the war as a “Humanitarian Operation” that followed a “zero-civilian casualty” 
policy that aimed to “liberate” Tamils from the clutches of “terrorism.”3  The powerful 
Rajapaksa clan4 maintained power for five-and-a-half years after the war ended, until 
Maithripala Sirisena defeated Mahinda Rajapaksa in presidential elections on January 8, 
2015.  During President Rajapaksa’s tenure, those who sought accountability or 
questioned his administration’s narrative of the war were labeled “terrorists” or members 
of the “LTTE rump.”5 
The government’s defeat of the LTTE came at a tremendous human cost.  In 
March 2011, a Panel of Experts commissioned by the U.N. Secretary General found 
credible allegations that both LTTE and government forces committed international 
crimes during the final months of the war.6  Their report cited allegations that Sri Lankan 
government forces “shelled on a large scale in three consecutive No Fire Zones where it 
had encouraged the civilian population to congregate,” deprived humanitarian aid to 
trapped civilians, summarily executed suspected LTTE members, and tortured and 
harshly interrogated internally displaced persons in refugee camps.  The Panel of Experts 
also reported alleged atrocities by the LTTE, including forced conscription of children as 
young as 14, locating military equipment in densely populated areas, and shooting 
civilians who attempted escape.  The report did not estimate casualties but suggested that 
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., See, e.g., Humanitarian Operation: Factual Analysis July 2006-May 2009, Ministry of Defence 
and Urban Development ¶ 9 (Jul.  31, 2011), available at http://slembassyusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/Sri-Lankan-Humanitarian-Operation-Factual-Analysis.pdf (last visited Oct.  21, 
2014). 
4
 Mahinda Rajapaksa’s brother, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, served as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence.  
Another brother, Basil Rajapaksa, served as Minister for Economic Development, overseeing all aspects of 
post-war reconstruction in the north and east.  A third brother, Chamal Rajapaksa, served as Speaker of 
Parliament and Minister for Ports and Aviation.  See, e.g., Infographics: Rajapaksa Family And Nepotism, 
Colombo Telegraph, Mar.  20, 2013, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/infographic-rajapaksa-
family-and-nepotism/ (last visited Feb.  23, 2015). 
5
 U.N.  High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, Opening Remarks at a Press Conference During 
her Visit to Sri Lanka Colombo (Aug.  31, 2013), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13673&LangID=E (last visited 
Oct.  19, 2014); The Sri Lankan Government retaliates to the proposed Human Rights Council resolution 
by arresting activists and witnesses, Asian Human Rights Comm’n (Mar.  17, 2014), 
http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-045-2014 (last visited Oct.  19, 2014). 
6
 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri 
Lanka, ¶ 258 (Mar.  31, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf (last visited Oct.  14, 2014). 
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as many as 40,000 civilians may have died, mostly as a result of shelling by government 
forces.7 
The U.N.’s failure to step in or speak publicly about the violence in Sri Lanka in 
2009 led to a complete rethink of U.N. policy during humanitarian crises.  An 
independent review panel concluded that the U.N.’s inaction in Sri Lanka reflected 
“systemic failure.”8  The U.N. Secretary-General, with assistance from the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, responded by introducing the “Rights Up Front” plan 
that prioritized human rights protection as a core purpose of all organs of the United 
Nations.9  In presenting the Rights Up Front plan, the Deputy Secretary General noted 
that systemic human rights violations often precede mass atrocities, and the challenges 
faced by the U.N. in Sri Lanka in 2009 were not new.10 
Having failed to step in and stop the bloodshed in 2009, the international 
community pressed for credible investigations and accountability in subsequent years.  
Human rights groups and civil society organizations pointed to Sri Lanka’s lack of 
domestic progress in pursuing justice: No one has been held accountable for even the 
most publicized and emblematic cases.11  In 2013, a commission on disappearances in the 
                                                 
7
 The number of civilian casualties remains highly contested.  A subsequent report to the U.N.  Panel of 
Experts Report suggested that as many as 70,000 civilians may have died in the final stages of the war.  See 
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel of United Nations Action 
in Sri Lanka, ¶ 34 (Nov.  10, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf 
(“Petrie Report”) (last visited Dec.  13, 2014).  By contrast, the Sri Lankan government, which initially 
clung to a “zero civilian casualties” narrative, admitted in 2013 that some civilians died in the crossfire as a 
result of wartime actions by the LTTE.  See Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence, Full Report of the Army Board 
on LLRC Observations, ¶¶ 57-61 (Jan.  25, 2013), available at 
http://www.army.lk/docimages/image/LLRC_2013.pdf (last visited Jan.  28, 2015); see also Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation (hereinafter, “LLRC Report) ¶ 4.112  (Nov.  
2011), available at 
http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201112/FINAL%20LLRC%20REPORT.pdf (last 
visited Feb.  25, 2015) (“The Army too had returned fire, using small arms and during the exchanges of 
fire, civilians were caught in the cross fire and casualties did occur.”). 
8
 Petrie Report, supra note 7. 
9
 The Secretary-General, Rights Up Front (May 2014), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/549141f84.html (last visited Apr.  2, 2015). 
10
 Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, Press Conference on Rights up Front Action Plan (Dec.  19, 
2013), http://www.un.org/sg/dsg/dsgoffthecuff.asp?nid=270 (last visited Nov.  25, 2014). 
11
 This includes the 2006 killings of five Tamil high school students in Trincomalee and seventeen aid 
workers from Action Contre La Faim.  The Office of the U.N.  High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on advice and technical 
assistance for the Government of Sri Lanka on promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka, 
¶¶ 33, 48-55, U.N.  Doc.  A/HRC/25/23 (Feb.  24, 2013). 
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North and East experienced witness tampering by government agents.12  A national 
commission on torture was shelved one month after its announcement.13  
Troublingly, credible allegations began to emerge of post-war human rights 
abuses and international crimes against Tamils.14  Buddhist extremism against Sri 
Lanka’s Muslim and Christian minorities also increased, punctuated by violent anti-
Muslim riots in four southern towns in June 2014.15  The international community 
maintained that Sri Lanka’s shortcomings signaled broader failures of governance and 
rule of law.16  In a 2014 report to the Human Rights Council, the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights stated that Sri Lanka’s lack of domestic progress could 
“no longer be explained as a function of time or technical capacity” but rather was 
“fundamentally a question of political will.”17 
By contrast, the Rajapaksa administration maintained that international 
accountability efforts were a threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.  The government harassed 
and intimidated human rights advocates and victims.18  It purported to pursue a 
                                                 
12See, e.g., Joint Civil Society Memorandum to the Human Rights Council and the International 
Community, Centre for Policy Alternatives (Mar.  4, 2014), available at http://www.cpalanka.org/joint-
civil-society-memorandum-to-the-human-rights-council-and-the-international-community/ (last visited Oct.  
19, 2014). 
13
 Id.  Responding to international pressure, President Rajapaksa expanded the mandate of the commission 
in 2014 to investigate civilian deaths during the end of the war, but it remains unclear whether the 
commission received such evidence or whether the change in government in 2015 has halted this 
investigation.  See Gazette No.  1871/18 (Jul.  15, 2014) (Sri Lanka) (expanding mandate of the 
disappearances commission and appointing Sir Desmond de Silva, Sir Geoffrey Nice, and David Crane to 
the newly formed Advisory Council); Gazette No.  1876/40 (Aug.  22, 2014) (Sri Lanka) (appointing 
additional members Advash Kaushal and Ahmer Bilal Soofi to the Advisory Council). 
14An Unfinished War: Torture and Sexual Violence in Sri Lanka 2009-2014, The Bar Human Rights 
Committee of England & Wales, and the International Truth & Justice Project, available at 
http://www.stop-torture.com/ (last visited Oct.  19, 2014); Crimes Against Humanity in Sri Lanka’s 
Northern Province: A Legal Analysis of Post-War Human Rights Violations, Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace 
& Justice (Mar.  4, 2014), available at http://www.srilankacampaign.org/about-us/library/ (last visited Apr.  
2, 1015). 
15
 Press Release, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Stop the promotion of hatred and 
faith-based violence, UN rights experts urge Sri Lanka (Jul.  2, 2014), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14812&LangID=E (last visited 
Oct.  19, 2014). 
16
 See A Crisis of Legitimacy: The Impeachment of Chief Justice Bandaranayake and the Erosion of the 
Rule of Law in Sri Lanka,  Int’l Bar Ass’n (Apr.  2013), available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=C90B7A2F-5EE2-4E5B-BE6C-F7FCB9864E81 
(last visited Oct.  19, 2014).  Shirani Bandaranayake was reinstated to the Supreme Court on January 28, 
2015, after Maithripala Sirisena’s defeat of Mahinda Rajapaksa in January 2015 presidential elections.  See 
Sri Lanka reinstates Chief Justice Shirani Bandaranayake, BBC News, Jan.  28, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31021540 (last visited Jan.  28, 2015).  She retired immediately after 
her reinstatement, her name having been cleared. 
17
 U.N.  Doc.  A/HRC/25/23, supra note 11, at ¶ 72. 
18
 Tamil Activist Detained in Sri Lanka, BBC News, Mar.  14, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
26577956 (last visited Jan.  20, 2014). 
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homegrown ‘reconciliation through economic development’ strategy, investing in 
infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka’s underdeveloped and Tamil-majority North.19  
On March 27, 2014, the UNHRC passed a resolution, co-sponsored by the U.S. 
and U.K., to promote reconciliation, accountability, and human rights in Sri Lanka.20  
This resolution was the third of its kind.21  The 2014 resolution was significantly stronger 
than those in prior years because it established an international U.N. investigation into 
alleged crimes by both sides to the conflict, whereas the 2012 and 2013 resolutions only 
asked the Sri Lankan government to make greater domestic progress toward 
accountability.22  
 
B. Accountability Advocacy by “Hardline” Diaspora Groups 
 
In the weeks leading up to the March 2014 resolution, differences emerged 
between different groups seeking accountability.  Although Tamil diaspora organizations, 
human rights groups, and many state actors supported an international investigation, 
groups diverged on how to get there.  Sri Lankan civil society organizations emphasized 
the need to end systemic impunity and strengthen the rule of law, while some diaspora 
groups advocated for accountability from the standpoint of state atrocities against Tamil 
people as members of a “Tamil Nation.”23  
The role of diaspora Tamils in funding the LTTE’s war for a “Tamil Eelam,” or 
an independent Tamil state, is well documented.24  However, the connection between the 
diaspora and the LTTE is complex and often misunderstood.  There are Tamil diaspora 
                                                 
19
 See, e.g., U.N.  High Commissioner for Human Rights, Oral Update of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka, delivered to the Human Rights 
Council, U.N.  Doc.  A/HRC/24/CRP.3/Rev.1; Sri Lanka’s North II, Rebuilding Under the Military, Int’l 
Crisis Group 2-3 (Mar.  16, 2012), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-
lanka/220-sri-lankas-north-ii-rebuilding-under-the-military.aspx (last visited Feb.  24, 2015); Anonymous, 
Against the Grain: Pursuing a Transitional Justice Agenda in Postwar Sri Lanka, Int’l J.  Transitional 
Justice 31, 31-32 (Feb.  17, 2011) (“The state appears to be working on the assumption that the economic 
recovery combined with the reestablishment of subnational democratic institutions in the north and east of 
the country will take care of all remaining minority grievances.”). 
20
 U.N.  Human Rights Council Res.  25/1, U.N.  Doc.  A/HRC/25/L.1.Rev.1 (Mar.  27, 2014). 
21
 U.N.  Human Rights Council Res.  19/2, U.N.  Doc.  A/HRC/RES/19/2 (Apr.  3, 2012); U.N.  Human 
Rights Council Res.  22/1, U.N.  Doc.  A/HRC/22.L.1/Rev.1 (Mar.  19, 2013). 
22
 See Res.  25/1, supra note 20 (Operative paragraph 10 calls on the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights to “undertake a comprehensive investigation” into human rights violations and crimes by 
both sides to the Sri Lankan conflict and “monitor” and “continue to assess” the human rights situation and 
domestic processes.”).  The OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL) interpreted its mandate to cover 
abuses that occurred from 2002 to November 2011. 
23
 See, e.g., Dormant diaspora rises up against US draft, demands genocide investigation, plebiscite, 
TamilNet, Mar.  10, 2014, http://tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=37091 (last visited Feb.  23, 2014). 
24See, e.g., The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE, Int’l Crisis Group i (Feb.  23, 2010), available 
at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/186-the-sri-lankan-tamil-diaspora-after-
the-ltte.aspx (last visited Jan.  28, 2015); see also Peter Chalk, The Tiger’s Abroad: How the LTTE 
Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka, 9 Geo.  J.  Int’l Aff.   97, 101 (2008); Funding the “Final 
War,” LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora, Human Rights Watch (Mar.  16, 2006), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/03/14/funding-final-war-2 (last visited Feb.  25, 2015). 
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organizations all over the world, and diaspora Tamils hold diverse political views.  As the 
International Crisis Group notes, “[n]ot every diaspora Tamil donated funds to the Tigers, 
not everyone supported them politically, and countless people were their victims.”25  
Likewise, those who support “Tamil Eelam” do not necessarily support the LTTE or 
advocate the use of violence.  Still, an apparent divide emerged in March 2014 between 
human rights groups and certain diaspora groups, despite their shared accountability goal. 
On March 20, 2014, a few diaspora Tamils and “hardline” Tamil politicians from 
Sri Lanka held a press conference at the Geneva Press Club titled, “Is the Sri Lanka 
resolution at the UNHRC part of the problem or part of the solution?”26  Diaspora 
members and certain politicians from Tamil parties in Sri Lanka criticized the draft U.S. 
and U.K. resolution on grounds that it failed to recognize Eelam Tamils’ claims to 
sovereignty.27  While citing a 66-year genocide of Tamil peoples, the speakers rejected 
grievances of other minorities, thus seeming to whitewash the LTTE’s ethnic cleansing of 
Muslims from the North and massacres in the East in the 1990s.  The views expressed 
seemed unapologetically separatist (in favor of Tamil Eelam) and in some cases, pro-
LTTE.  Recounting Sri Lanka’s past, one diaspora speaker stated that the LTTE became 
the “sole representative” of the Tamil people.28  Throughout the three weeks of UNHRC 
                                                 
25
 The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE, supra note 24, at 4. 
26
 Press Conference, Is the Sri Lanka resolution at the UNHRC part of the problem or part of the solution? 
(hereinafter, “Geneva Press Club meeting”) (Mar.  21, 2014), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IcegKPYr1LM (last visited Oct.  14, 2014). 
27The speakers at the press conference criticized the U.S.  and U.K.’s draft resolution on Sri Lanka, arguing 
that any resolution that worked to legitimize the Sri Lankan state would not improve ground realities for 
Tamils in Sri Lanka.  The speakers stated that by singling out human rights abuses against religious 
minorities without using the word “Tamil,” the draft resolution whitewashed a six-decade structural 
genocide against Tamils in Sri Lanka.  To those who spoke, any UNHRC resolution, including one that 
called for an international commission of inquiry, would not bring about accountability or reconciliation 
because it would be premised on the functioning of a racist Sinhalese state.   Id.; see also UNHRC 
resolution with weak mandate will not help Tamils, says Gajendrakumar, TamilNet, Mar.  24, 2014, 
http://tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=37131 (last visited Feb.  24, 2015); Guruparan addresses de-
Tamilization, dichotomization in Geneva narrative, TamilNet, Mar.  25, 2014, 
http://tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=37132 (last visited Feb.  25, 2015); Activists from homeland, 
diaspora address UNHRC, TamilNet, Mar.  25, 2014, http://tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=37134 
(last visited Feb.  24, 2015).  One speaker explained that the draft resolution distorted relevant issues by 
framing Sri Lanka’s problems as human rights violations or religious problems.  Geneva Press Club 
meeting, supra note 26.  Such issues could be solved through increased democracy, he explained, whereas 
Tamil survival and nationhood could not.  The speaker asserted that true peace and regional security 
required addressing Tamils’ rights to nationhood, homeland, and self-determination.  Although he did not 
advocate a return to violence, he told the audience that the LTTE took to arms because of systematic 
problems that continue to present.  Id.; see also Krisna Saravanamuttu, The UNHRC Resolution: A Critical 
Interrogation, http://tamilyouth.ca/the-unhrc-resolution-a-critical-interrogation/ (last visited Feb.  27, 2015) 
(“Human rights problems can be rectified in a more liberal-democratic Sri Lanka….  But, human rights law 
cannot deal with the structural nature of Sri Lanka that privileges the Sinhala nation to violently subjugate 
the Tamils.”).   
28
 Geneva Press Club meeting, supra note 26. 
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sessions in March 2014, LTTE sympathizers among the Tamil diaspora held large public 
rallies waving hundreds of Tiger flags.29 
The differences that emerged in Geneva in March 2014 between human rights 
groups and certain diaspora Tamil organizations raised broader questions about the role 
of diaspora advocacy for accountability.  Framing differences with the Sri Lankan 
government were to be expected, given the Rajapaksa administration’s labeling of the 
war as a “Humanitarian Operation” to defeat “terrorism” and its outright hostility to war 
crimes accountability.  However, what emerged in Geneva were differences between 
those supposedly on the same side of the accountability debate.  A human rights group 
could profess to be neutral on the question of separate statehood for Sri Lanka’s Tamils.  
However, by supporting a resolution that aimed to strengthen the rule of law throughout 
the island nation, these groups implicitly supported the territorial integrity of the Sri 
Lankan state.30  
Many human rights groups maintain distance from pro-Tiger and pro-Eelam 
diaspora groups and caution them to moderate their tone.31  Some distance may be 
understandable, given the Tamil diaspora’s role in funding the war.  Many human rights 
and civil society organizations express deep discomfort with affiliating with groups 
linked to the LTTE and want to avoid any appearance of whitewashing LTTE crimes, 
which included suicide bombings, disappearances, child conscription, ethnic cleansing, 
and targeted killings.  International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) in 
particular may feel concern that they would compromise their commitment to other 
human rights causes in partnering with perceived ‘radicalized’ diaspora Tamils.32  
From a strategic standpoint, certain forms of diaspora advocacy, such as “pro-
Eelam” advocacy, may also make the “pitch” for accountability harder for human rights 
groups and “pragmatic” diaspora groups committed to a united Sri Lanka.33  Human 
rights groups, civil society organizations, and more moderate diaspora groups may 
                                                 
29
 See, e.g., Dormant diaspora rises up against US draft, supra note 23. 
30
 Sri Lanka expert Alan Keenan makes a similar point: “imposing a balanced framework on a conflict that 
is certain to be unbalanced in multiple and incommensurable ways threatens to impose a particular vision 
of what the conflict is about and what its settlement should look like, precisely those issues that should be 
open for debate and discussion by all parties.” See Alan Keenan, The Trouble with Even-handedness: On 
the Politics of Human Rights and Peace Advocacy in Sri Lanka, in Nongovernment Politics, 88-117 (M.  
Fehner ed.  2007).  State actors like the United States are less conflicted: they “do[] not endorse the 
establishment of another independent state on the island.” K.  Alan Kronstadt and Bruce Vaughn, Sri 
Lanka: Background and U.S.  Relations, Congressional Research Service 14 (Jun.  4, 2009), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125940.pdf (last visited Oct.  21, 2014).   
31
 Author’s conversations with researchers at international NGOs; The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the 
LTTE, supra note 24, at i (“[U]ntil it moves on from its separatist, pro-LTTE ideology, the diaspora is 
unlikely to play a useful role in supporting a just and sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.”). 
32For example, Amnesty International faced a very public controversy in choosing to partner with former 
Guantanamo inmate Moazzam Begg, a U.K.  citizen with alleged Taliban ties.  Diana Hortsch, The 
Paradox of Partnership: Amnesty International, Responsible Advocacy, and NGO Accountability, 42 
Colum.  Hum.  Rts.  L.  Rev.  119, 155 (2010). 
33
 Some have privately remarked that diaspora advocacy in Geneva may have influenced certain countries 
to vote against the 2014 UNHRC resolution or abstain from voting.  Author’s interview with anonymous 
(April 29, 2014). 
8
International Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/ihrlj/vol1/iss1/2
choose to keep a distance from groups that espouse separatism because they believe that 
such advocacy will not strategically help their push for accountability.  These concerns 
merit consideration and are discussed in Section II.C. 
However, alienating pro-Tiger and pro-Eelam groups may not be the best 
approach.  Over the past few years, some diaspora Tamil groups have become more 
strident in their protests, advocating for a framing of the ethnic conflict as “genocide,” 
arguing for recognition of Tamil nationhood, and waving LTTE flags before the U.N. and 
government capitals.34  These voices have grown louder and more organized over the past 
few years and are unlikely to dissipate entirely with the change in government or other 
new developments.  To the extent that these Tamils are viewed as “spoilers” to the 
accountability process, it may be more effective to engage than to ignore.   
From a less cynical perspective, the growing magnitude of these protests and the 
disconnect in messaging may suggest that some diaspora Tamils feel marginalized and 
disillusioned with the broader push for accountability.35  As one diaspora writer stated: 
 
A section of the International Community once saw the LTTE as the 
problem to resolving the conflict, believing the Sri Lanka state that 
elimination of the LTTE would create a space for a political solution and 
national reconciliation.  However, evolving developments are clear 
evidence that past assumptions were incorrect.  The same section of the 
International Community and the Sri Lankan state now see the Tamil 
Diaspora as trouble-makers.36 
 
In light of the apparent distance between human rights groups and certain “hardline” 
diaspora groups in the push for accountability, the bulk of this article aims to take a step 
back to understand why certain diaspora voices for accountability seem to diverge from 
the “mainstream” and whether divergent narratives can nevertheless be included in Sri 
Lanka’s transitional justice framework. 
 
C. Competing Diaspora Advocacy for Accountability 
 
Not all diaspora Tamils shared the views of the Geneva Press Club speakers.  
There were, and continue to be, deep divisions between diaspora groups engaged in 
                                                 
34
 See, e.g., Oliver Walton, Framing disputes and organizational legitimation: UK-based Sri Lankan Tamil 
diaspora groups’ use of the ‘genocide’ frame since 2009, Ethnic & Racial Studies, 1 (2014) (arguing that 
while at first pass the increasing use of the ‘genocide’ frame appears counterproductive in bolstering 
international legitimacy, its use may serve complex goals, including demonstrating independence from 
international agendas by replacing frames of reconciliation, war crimes, and crimes against humanity with 
frames of self-determination, statehood, and genocide). 
35
 One speaker at the Geneva Press Club meeting stated his view that Western countries and international 
NGOs had silenced pro-Eelam groups in Geneva, thereby denying Tamils a voice in their own affairs just 
as the Sri Lankan government had done for decades.  Geneva Press Club meeting, supra note 26. 
36
 Nirmanusan Balasundaram, Is the Tamil Diaspora Against Unity in Sri Lanka?, Groundviews, May 4, 
2013, http://groundviews.org/2013/05/04/is-the-tamil-diaspora-against-unity-in-sri-lanka/ (last visited Oct.  
21, 2014). 
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accountability advocacy.  This section highlights some of those differences to emphasize 
the diversity among diaspora groups seeking accountability. 
In early March 2014, the U.S. and U.K. released their first draft of the UNHRC 
resolution.  Diaspora groups uniformly criticized the draft on grounds that it fell short of 
creating an international commission of inquiry.37  Shortly after, the U.S. and U.K. 
released a second draft, clarifying the U.N.’s investigative mandate.  Some diaspora 
groups welcomed the revisions, stating that it addressed prior concerns.  Others, however, 
continued to express disappointment.  The divergent responses to the revised draft typify 
the deep divisions and ideological battles between competing diaspora groups.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 See, e.g., Strong calls for international investigation on first day of HRC session, Tamil Guardian, Mar.  
3, 2014, http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=10130 (last visited Feb.  23, 2015) (citing 
positions of Tamils Against Genocide, Canadian Tamil Congress, British Tamils Forum, and US Tamil 
Political Action Council). 
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For example, Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) and British Tamils Forum (BTF) 
both criticized the first draft, but CTC, unlike BTF, welcomed the revised second draft: 
 
 Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) British Tamils Forum (BTF) 
First 
Draft 
“[A] proposed draft of a new 
resolution on Sri Lanka, revealed on 
Monday, fails to offer any 
meaningful progress towards 
accountability, let alone 
reconciliation.  The proposed 
resolution effectively mutes the 
chorus of calls for an International 
Commission of Inquiry, and instead 
continues to give Sri Lanka time and 
space.  The proposal appears to seek 
the High Commissioner’s assistance 
in undertaking an investigation, 
however, it does not give her the 
mandate, resources, or direction to 
investigate and make a legal finding 
of fact.”38 
“The insubstantial draft resolution on 
Sri Lanka that was released yesterday 
at the United Nations Human Rights 
council (UNHRC) has greatly 
disappointed and shocked the Tamil 
people, who are the primary victims of 
the ongoing conflict in the Island of Sri 
Lanka.  The resolution text effectively 
calls for more of the same: it requests 
another update by the Human Rights 
Commissioner in a year’s time and 
makes another call on Sri Lanka to 
launch a credible domestic inquiry – 
despite the Human Rights 
Commissioner herself declaring that 
Sri Lanka has no political will to 
investigate itself.”39 
 
Second 
Draft 
“United Nations Human Rights 
Council draft resolution 25/1 
(revised), if adopted, would finally 
serve as a meaningful step towards 
accountability and justice in Sri 
Lanka, in line with recommendations 
by many previous UN bodies.  The 
clarification and strengthened 
language in the latest revision 
addresses many of the concerns 
previously raised by the Canadian 
Tamil Congress (CTC).”40 
“As far as Tamils are concerned, the 
resolution in its current form has a 
number of serious defects.  It fails to 
recognise the ethnocratic dimension of 
the conflict in the island of Sri 
Lanka….  There is a common theme to 
the draft resolution’s shortcomings; we 
appeal to Member States to understand 
the pattern behind the violence and 
oppression – to perceive the underlying 
theme of a structural genocide of the 
Tamils.”41 
 
                                                 
38
 Canadian Tamil Congress Press Release, New Resolution on Sri Lanka Falls Short: Time for UNHRC to 
Take Decisive Action, Mar.  3, 2014, 
http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/article.php?lan=eng&cat=pr&id=124 (last visited Feb.  23, 2015). 
39
 British Tamils Forum Press Release, Sri Lanka’s victims dismayed by draft resolution at UNHRC, Mar.  
4, 2014, http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2014/03/sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-victims-dismayed-by-draft-resolution-
at-unhrc/ (last visited Feb.  23, 2015). 
40
 Canadian Tamil Congress Press Release, Canadian Tamil Congress appreciates Revised Draft 
Resolution on Promoting reconciliation, accountability, and human rights in Sri Lanka, Mar.  17, 2014, 
http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/article.php?lan=eng&cat=pr&id=125 (last visited Feb.  23, 2015). 
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In recent years, some groups, such as CTC and Australian Tamil Congress (ATC) 
have opted for what seems to be a pragmatic approach, welcoming incremental 
international progress toward accountability and using caution with words like “Eelam” 
or “genocide.”  Others, such as the BTF, International Council of Eelam Tamils (ICET), 
and the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) have opted for what I will 
call a more hardline stance (or a more principled one, depending on perspective).42  Deep 
fissures between diaspora Tamil groups post-2009 “reflect[] different strands of thinking 
and ideology.”43  To further complicate the analysis, approaches to accountability can 
also evolve over time within a diaspora organization.44  
Ideological differences extend beyond accountability advocacy.  In January 2015, 
as voters turned to the polls in Sri Lanka, the Tamil National Alliance, the major Tamil 
party, decided to support opposition candidate Maithripala Sirisena over Mahinda 
Rajapaksa.45  ICET argued that regime change would do nothing for “Eelam Tamils,” as 
“[t]he continuing genocide of the Tamil Nation is the direct consequence of the anti-
Tamil stance of the Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony.”46  BTF stated that Sirisena’s victory 
“will not still resolve the immediate issues faced by the Tamil people nor address the 
fundamental issue that has affected the Tamils in Sri Lanka for a very long time.”47  
TGTE’s leader stated that Sirisena’s victory “enabled only a face change such that the 
very same [Sinhala-Buddhist] chauvinist structure could reassert itself further.”48  
By contrast, CTC welcomed the election results, stating: “Mr.  Sirisena’s election 
marks the end of a decade-long dynastic dictatorship of the Rajapakse family, and hails 
                                                                                                                                                 
41
 British Tamils Forum Press Release, BTF welcomes explicit call for investigation but proposed 
resolution still has far to go, Mar.  18, 2014, http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2014/03/btf-welcomes-explicit-call-
for-investigation-but-proposed-resolution-still-has-far-to-go/ (last visited Feb.  23, 2015). 
42
 See, e.g., Walton, supra note 34, at 8 (“GTF, for example, has not used the term [genocide] frequently 
based on the calculation that using the term might undermine their access at the UN.”); Samuel Oakford, 
Genocide Replaces Separatism in Tamil Diaspora Vocabulary, Inter Press Service, Oct.  26, 2013, 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/10/genocide-replaces-separatism-in-tamil-diaspora-vocabulary/ (last visited 
Feb.  23, 2015) (contrasting “tone” of CTC’s advocacy with that of TGTE). 
43
 Cathrine Brun and Nicholas Van Hear, Between the local and the diasporic: the shifting centre of gravity 
in war-torn Sri Lankan transnational politics, 20 Contemporary South Asia 61, 70 (2012). 
44
 For example, the BTF “largely avoided using the term ‘genocide’ in press releases, until 2012, when it 
began to use the term frequently.” Walton, supra note 34, at 9. 
45
 See, e.g., TNA Supports Maithri: Full Statement Issued By The TNA, Colombo Telegraph, Dec.  30, 2014, 
http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/tna-supports-maithri/ (last visited Feb.  23, 2015). 
46
 Sri Ranjan, Neither Mahinda Nor Maithri Is Fit To Be The Choice Of Ealam Tamils: ICET, Colombo 
Telegraph, Jan.  1, 2015, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/neither-mahinda-nor-maithri-is-fit-
to-be-the-choice-of-ealam-tamils-icet/comment-page-1/ (last visited Feb.  23, 2015). 
47
 British Tamils Forum Press Release, British Tamil Forum response to the election results and the new 
government in Sri Lanka, Jan.  9, 2015, http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2015/01/british-tamil-forum-response-to-
the-election-results-and-the-new-government-in-sri-lanka/ (last visited Feb.  23, 2015). 
48
 Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, Tamil Votes Amounted Not An Endorsement of Sirisena, Colombo 
Telegraph, Jan.  21, 2015, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/tamil-votes-amounted-not-an-
endorsement-of-sirisena/ (last visited Feb.  23, 2015). 
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the possibility and hope for a new democratic era.”49  Global Tamil Forum expressed 
“hope that the new administration will engage the Diaspora in good faith and in a 
meaningful way.”50  
As this discussion shows, diaspora Tamil advocacy is not monolithic.  Different 
groups strongly disagree on how to frame calls for accountability and chart the 
appropriate political course for Tamils in Sri Lanka.  These differences have persisted 
since 2009, and there is no reason to believe they will ease as Sri Lanka moves forward. 
The Sirisena administration and the international community may find it easier to 
engage with some diaspora groups over others.51  There may be greater room to engage 
with groups like CTC than with groups like ICET in making incremental progress toward 
accountability, insofar as international will for a U.N. Security Council referral to the 
International Criminal Court or appetite for an independent Tamil Eelam are lacking.  
However, this article avoids mapping capacities for strategic engagement across diaspora 
groups, choosing instead to explore possible ways to include diverse diaspora narratives 
within an inclusive transitional justice framework for Sri Lanka.  As discussed in Section 
V, diaspora Tamils, whether hardline or pragmatic, may have a stake as victims in 
transitional justice mechanisms that seek truth, pursue justice, and provide redress. 
 
III. Diaspora Accountability Advocacy: “Lawfare” or “Long-Distance 
Nationalism”? 
 
Recently, legal scholars have started to ask whether the political use of 
international humanitarian law results in illegitimate “lawfare,” or the use of law as a tool 
of war.  Likewise, some political science and international relations scholars focus on 
whether conflict-generated diasporas behave as peace-promoters or peace-wreckers.  As 
discussed below, both analyses fall short.  Diaspora Tamils have pushed for justice in Sri 
Lanka for decades, and they will continue to do so regardless of whether they are viewed 
as engaging in lawfare or peace-wrecking behavior.  The real question, discussed in 
Sections IV and V, is how to understand the motivations behind diaspora advocacy and 
whether diverse diaspora narratives can be incorporated in an inclusive transitional 
justice framework. 
 
                                                 
49
 Canadian Tamil Congress Press Release, Canadian Tamil Congress Congratulates Maitrhipala Sirisena, 
Jan.  9, 2015, http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/article.php?lan=eng&cat=pr&id=154 (last visited Feb.  
23, 2015). 
50
 Global Tamil Forum Press Release, GTF eager for talks between new SL government and Tamil 
Diaspora groups, Jan.  11, 2015, http://www.globaltamilforum.org/media/news/gtf-eager-for-talks-
between-new-sl-government-and-tamil-diaspora-groups-gtf-eager-for-talks-between-new-sl-government-
and-tamil-diaspora-groups.aspx (last visited Feb.  23, 2015). 
51
 The International Crisis Group suggests that Sri Lanka and other governments “should do their best to 
support moderate, non-separatist voices within the diaspora.” The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the 
LTTE, supra note 24, at 24.  A U.S.  government cable likewise recognized that the diaspora Tamil 
community was not “homogeneous” and recommended “a redoubled effort to reach out to Tamil groups in 
the U.S.” See Classified Cable from Ambassador Blake, Sri Lanka, Engaging the Tamil Diaspora, 
Wikileaks, Mar.  20, 2009, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09COLOMBO314_a.html (last visited 
Feb.  27, 2015). 
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 A. Lawfare? 
 
Lawfare has become a buzzword.  Though its meaning is contested, it is 
commonly used to refer to the “strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for 
traditional means to achieve an operational objective.”52   The term was coined in 2001 
by American military lawyer Charles Dunlap, who argued that “the use of law as a 
weapon of war is the [newest] feature of twenty-first century combat.”53  
Proponents of the lawfare critique argue that the use of lawfare is “illegitimate 
and untenable” to the extent it risks politicizing and undermining respect for international 
law.54  Opponents argue that the lawfare critique misses the mark and impermissibly 
seeks to limit or stigmatize the pursuit of legal recourse, particularly through international 
law.55  For example, military lawyer Gregory Noone argues that “[a]lthough there are real 
and important harms that can be caused by those who abuse the law and have no interest 
in justice, the harm would be greater if access to the courts is limited.”56  The lawfare 
critique is criticized for “fail[ing] to recognize that the central purpose of any legal 
system is to offer a viable alternative to the use of force.” 57  Indeed, Dunlap himself 
suggests that “rather than warring over semantics, we should enthusiastically embrace the 
                                                 
52
 Charles J.  Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 Yale J.  Int’l Aff.  146, 156 (2008). 
53
 Charles J.  Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century 
Conflicts (Carr Center for Human Rights, John F.  Kennedy Sch.  of Gov't, Harvard U., Working Paper, 
2001), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of% 
20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf (last visited Oct.  17, 2014).  Commonly cited examples of lawfare include: Bush 
Administration officials accusing private attorneys representing Guantanamo inmates of engaging in 
“lawfare.” Scott Horton, The Dangers of Lawfare, 43 Case W.  Res.  J.  Int’l L.  163 (2010); Israel’s 
defenders criticizing The Goldstone Report on Israeli military action in Gaza from 2008-2009 as “lawfare.” 
Michael Newton, Illustrating Illegitimate Lawfare, 43 Case W.  Res.  J.  Int’l L.  255 (2010); critics 
claiming Serbia engaged in “lawfare” by filing suit before the International Court of Justice challenging 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence following Serbia’s military defeat.  Paul R.  Williams, Lawfare: A 
War Worth Fighting, 43 Case W.  Res.  J.  Int’l L.  145, 149 (2010); and Israeli and Palestinian attempts to 
document war crimes by the other side after the 2014 Gaza War, again prompting cries of “lawfare.” See, 
e.g., Kevin Connolly, Israeli-Palestinian conflict: How ‘lawfare’ has become a weapon, BBC News, Oct.  
8, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29423784 (last visited Oct.  17, 2014). 
54
 Newton, supra note 53, at 255 (“Illegitimate exploitation of the law in turn permits the legal structure to 
be portrayed as a mass of indeterminate subjectivity that is nothing more than another weapon in the moral 
domain of conflict at the behest of the side with the best cameras, biggest microphones, and most compliant 
media accomplices.”). 
55
 William J.  Aceves, Litigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict in U.S.  Courts: Critiquing the Lawfare Critique, 
43 Case W.  Res.  J.  Int’l L.  313, 318 (2010); William A.  Schabas, Gaza, Goldstone, and Lawfare, 43 
Case W.  Res.  J.  Int’l L.  307, 308-09 (2010); Gregory P.  Noone, Lawfare or Strategic Communications?, 
43 Case W.  Res.  J.  Int’l L.  73, 75-76 (2010); see also Neve Gordon, Human Rights as a Security Threat: 
Lawfare and the Campaign against Human Rights NGOs, 48 Law & Soc’y Rev.  311, 313 (2014) (“The 
construction of human rights as a security threat, it should be emphasized, is carried out not in order to 
reject human rights tout court, but in order to curb what neoconservative groups define as a particular 
‘political’ application of human rights.”). 
56
 Noone, supra note 55, at 85. 
57
 Aceves, supra note 55, at 318. 
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extent to which lawfare may facilitate courtroom combat replacing conventional combat 
as the situs of many 21st century conflicts.”58 
Applied to the Sri Lankan context, accountability efforts by some diaspora Tamils 
could be viewed as “lawfare” to the extent these efforts are grounded in the pursuit for a 
separatist Tamil homeland.  For example, attempts by some diaspora members to ignore 
or minimize human rights abuses faced by other minorities in Sri Lanka—or to oppose 
solutions that would strengthen the rule of law throughout Sri Lanka—could be seen as 
acts of lawfare through U.N. mechanisms.   
Although human rights groups have yet to apply the “lawfare” label, some human 
rights advocates have made similar types of arguments about diaspora accountability 
advocacy.  In a paper titled, “War by Other Means?” Richard Gowing argued that despite 
employing the universal language of human rights, the rhetoric used by some 
accountability advocates in the Tamil diaspora reveals an underlying political agenda.59  
Similarly, the International Crisis Group stated that post-war “diaspora initiatives attempt 
to carry forward the struggle for an independent state in more transparent and democratic 
ways, but they are still pursuing the LTTE’s agenda, just without its guns.”60  
The problem with this type of analysis is that it fails to suggest an appropriate 
response.  Assuming that certain diaspora Tamils engage in lawfare in pursuit of 
accountability, responding with the “lawfare” label accomplishes little.  Diaspora 
activists will push for accountability for what they view as violations of international 
criminal law whether or not their advocacy is deemed lawfare.  As some practitioners 
note, “lawfare exists and is used every day by both those seeking to achieve legitimate 
ends and those seeking to achieve illegitimate ends,” and it would be “naïve” to fail to 
adequately consider the political ramifications of international criminal justice.61  
Moreover, accusing Tamil diaspora groups of lawfare is exactly what the 
Rajapaksa administration did to tarnish international accountability efforts.  The lawfare 
critique is criticized for relying on the term as a code that connotes an entire argument for 
conservatives (neoconservatives and right-wing ideologues, in particular) to stigmatize all 
arguments drawn from international law, particularly as to those who represent alleged 
terrorists.62  Former President Rajapaksa framed the decades-long ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka as a “terrorism” problem, resolved by the government’s military defeat of the 
Tigers in 2009.  His administration branded diaspora accountability efforts as an attempt 
                                                 
58
 Charles J.  Dunlap, Jr., Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, 43 Case W.  Res.  J.  Int’l L., 142-43 (2010). 
59
 Richard Gowing, War by Other Means? An analysis of the contested terrain of transitional justice under 
the ‘Victor’s Peace’ in Sri Lanka (London School of Economics Working Paper No.  13-138) 23-24, 31 
(Jan.  2013) (also arguing that the Rajapaksa government’s constructed narrative of transitional justice 
revealed a hidden political agenda).  Note: This paper was published before Gowing joined Sri Lanka 
Campaign for Peace and Justice as its Deputy Director and does not necessarily reflect the views of that 
organization. 
60The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE, supra note 24. 
61
 Williams, supra note 53, at 145; David Crane, The Take Down: Case Studies Regarding “Lawfare” in 
International Criminal Justice: The West African Experience, 43 Case W.  Res.  J.  Int’l L.  201, 212 
(2011). 
62
 See Schabas, supra note 55, at 308-309; Noone, supra note 55, at 75-76; Horton, supra note 53. 
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to achieve could not be obtained on the battlefield: an independent homeland for 
Tamils.63  
It is in this spirit that in March 2014, the Rajapaksa administration proscribed 16 
Tamil diaspora organizations and 424 individuals as “terrorism” financers.64  This was 
followed by a blanket ban barring all foreign passport holders from visiting the north.65  
Then-Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa accused diaspora Tamils of misusing 
tourist visas to engage in political activities, “projecting false propaganda on human right 
violations.”66  Parliamentary discussion regarding the travel ban underscored the 
administration’s narrative frame, in which diaspora Tamils were equated with Tiger 
terrorists: 
 
The Hon.  M.A.  Sumanthiran [Tamil politician from the TNA party]: 
“Why is the North being treated as a separate country?” is the question 
that I am posing.  People who come into this country can freely get about 
anywhere else but not to the North.  You have to get a special permit to go 
to the North.  […] 
An Hon.  Member: There can be LTTEers going to Jaffna. 
The Hon.M.A.  Sumanthiran: Where is the LTTE? I thought you destroyed 
them fully. 
An Hon.  Member: A diaspora.67 
 
                                                 
63
 See, e.g., Udeshi Amarasinghe, Modus Operandi: Tamil Diaspora and LTTE Organizations, Jun.  5, 
2014, 
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Modus_Operandi_Tamil_Diaspora_and_LTTE_Organisations_201
40605_05 (last visited Oct.  19, 2014); TNA Says Un-Ban Ban, Apr.  30, 2014, 
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=TNA_Says_UN_BAN_BAN_20140430_01 (government minister 
declared Tamil National Alliance politicians, who form the majority in the Tamil-dominated North, 
“terrorists” for calling on Sri Lanka to retract the ban on diaspora organizations).    
64
 Gazette No.  1854/41 (Mar.  21, 2014) (Sri Lanka), available at https://www.colombotelegraph.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/sl_banned_names.pdf (last visited Oct.  19, 2014).  As peace activist Jehan Perera 
writes, the Sri Lankan government takes a hard stance against the UNHRC war crimes investigation, 
describing it as “an international conspiracy to punish the country’s leaders who defeated the LTTE and … 
eventually seek the division of the country.” Jehan Perera, Shift In Priority From Ethno-Nationalism To 
Good Governance, Colombo Telegraph, Oct.  20, 2014, 
https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/shift-in-priority-from-ethno-nationalism-to-good-
governance/ (last visited Oct.  20, 2014). 
65
 Prior approval for foreign nationals visiting the north, Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, 
Oct.  16, 2014, 
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Prior_approval_for_foreigners_visiting_the_North_20141016_02 
(last visited Nov.  4, 2014). 
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 Some tourists engage in politics, Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Jan.  4, 2014, 
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Some_tourists_engage_in_politics_20140104_02 (last visited Jan.  
25, 2015). 
67
 M.A.  Sumanthiran, Tamils Were Not Fooled By Any Of The Roads, The Bridges, The Mega Projects 
Govt Gave, Colombo Telegraph, Nov.  3, 2014, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/tamils-
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The Rajapaksa administration declared the Tamil Diaspora as the new enemy in the 
state’s war on terror.  In September 2009, the Secretary to the Ministry of Defense stated 
that allegations of war crimes by the diaspora constituted a threat “as serious as the one 
posed by the LTTE.”68 In May 2010, military spokesperson Major General Samarasinghe 
stated:  
 
[W]e have won the war in Sri Lanka but internationally the second phase 
of the war has started.  Not only the forces, but the whole nation, including 
the people living overseas must get together and stop this international 
LTTE propaganda and activities.  We will have to conduct a separate 
operation on that which the government has already started.69 
 
The Minister of External Affairs declared in 2010 that “boycott Sri Lanka” campaigns 
were undertaken by “[diaspora] groups close to the LTTE, knowing very well that they 
cannot unleash violence the way they did with impunity in the past.”70  
It would be less than satisfying to adopt the Rajapaksa government’s framework 
to further diminish and marginalize diaspora views.  An Israeli scholar notes that 
accusations by neoconservatives that “human rights work is lawfare” aims to silence and 
obstruct this type of work.71  Moreover, some argue that applying a counter-terrorism 
framework to diaspora Tamil advocacy effectively “negates the role of the Sri Lankan 
state in establishing the conditions of conflict.”72  As discussed in Sections IV and V, an 
inclusive transitional justice program for Sri Lanka may require a more nuanced 
approach. 
 
 
                                                 
68
 Sri Lanka targeted for defeating LTTE terror-Defence Sec., Sept.  18, 2009, 
http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200909/20090918sl_targeted_defeating_ltte_terror.
htm (last visited Nov.  7, 2014). 
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propaganda-crackdown.html (last visited Nov.  7, 2014). 
70Minister Peiris refutes LTTE Propaganda in London, President Media Unit, Oct.  21, 2010, 
http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201010/20101021minister_peiris_refutes_ltte_prop
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‘War on Terror’ as Terror 97 (Scott Poynting and David Whyte, eds., 2012) (arguing that “terrorism” 
framing on the part of the Sri Lankan government before and after the war masks state violence).  Post-
regime change, the Sirisena administration appears to have softened the narrative, canceling the travel ban 
for foreign passport holders; Venkat Narayan, Mangala promises demilitarisation of North, domestic war 
crimes probe...  calls upon TNA to join govt, The Island, Jan.  20, 2015, 
http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=118038 (last 
visited Jan.  21, 2015); Sri Lanka Scraps Ban on Foreigners Visiting Northern Former War Zone, N.Y.  
Times, Jan.  16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2015/01/16/world/asia/16reuters-sri-lanka-north-
ban.html (last visited Jan.  21, 2015).  However, as of the time of this article, targeted bans on 424 diaspora 
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 Gordon, supra note 55, at 318. 
72
 Sentas, supra note 70, at 107. 
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B. Long-Distance Nationalism? 
 
There is a growing body of literature on the role of conflict-generated diasporas in 
promoting peace or fueling conflict.  The term “conflict-generated diasporas” refers to 
groups, such as Tamils, “who have fled their country due to large-scale violence and 
abuses.”73  At the risk of oversimplification, the bulk of literature in this genre evaluates 
whether conflict-generated diasporas are good or bad actors by assessing whether they 
help secure peace or prolong homeland conflict.74  
A 2004 study by World Bank economists concluded that “a large diaspora 
considerably increases the risk of repeat conflict.”75  Benedict Anderson coined the 
phrase “long-distance nationalists” to characterize the role of conflict-generated diasporas 
in prolonging homeland conflicts.  He argued that diaspora groups pursue identity politics 
and fuel exclusionary movements in their home countries because they do not have to 
face the consequences—in effect, engaging in politics without accountability.76  This 
analysis frames diaspora advocacy as “hate from a distance”77  by “distant warriors”78 
who can take out their “frustrations and fantasies”79 without having to face political 
consequences.  Some scholars assert that diaspora politicking is motivated by “guilt of 
departure” from leaving fellow compatriots behind in a war zone.80  Along the same vein, 
a World Bank policy paper concluded that “diasporas tend to be more extreme than the 
population remaining in the country of origin: supporting extremism is a simple way of 
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Steven Vertovec, Diasporas good? Diasporas bad? (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Univ.  of 
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 Michael Ignatieff, The hate stops here, Globe & Mail, Oct.  25, 2001 at A17 (“Diaspora nationalism is a 
dangerous phenomenon because it is easier to hate from a distance: You don't have to live with the 
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78
 Camilla Orjuela, Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers? Multiple Diaspora Roles in Sri Lanka’s 
Violent Conflict.  8 Global Networks 436, 441 (2008). 
79
 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era 1951 (2013); Anderson, supra 
note 76, at 75. 
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 Ignatieff, supra note 77. 
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asserting continued identity with the place that has been left.”81  Conflict-generated 
diasporas, it is argued, may resist conflict resolution because homeland conflict may 
sustain diaspora identities in a foreign land.82 
By contrast, other studies note the potentially positive role that diaspora groups 
can play in negotiating and maintaining peace after a period of conflict.83  Some note the 
potential ability of diasporas “to transmit the values of pluralism and democracy” to their 
home countries.84  Other studies conclude that conflict-generated diasporas support 
violence in certain political circumstances in their home countries but promote peace in 
other circumstances.85  
In the context of Sri Lanka, diaspora Tamils are generally classified as peace-
wreckers with regard to their support for the LTTE.86  As one author concludes: 
 
Since 2009, the Tamil diaspora community—those Tamils who fled the 
country during the course of the war—have been, by all accounts, 
absolutely instrumental in egging on remnants of the LTTE.  From the 
sidelines and with no stakes in the consequences, they spew ‘racist vitriol’ 
through avenues like TamilNet to encourage a rekindling of the war in the 
pursuit of a Tamil homeland.87 
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(2003). 
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Feargal Cochrane, Bahar Baser & Ashok Swain, Home Thoughts from Abroad: Diasporas and Peace-
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Other studies acknowledge diaspora Tamils as potential peace-promoters, particularly 
with regard to their efforts in securing the 2002 ceasefire agreement between the Sri 
Lankan government and the LTTE.88 
In the post-war context, some have suggested a growing disconnect between 
Tamils in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora on the issue of Tamil nationalism.89  It is argued 
that post-war initiatives, such as ‘transnational’ diaspora organizations and referenda on 
the question of Tamil Eelam, “had very little purchase among the Tamils in Sri Lanka 
whose cause they claimed to espouse, underlining the apparently now large disconnect 
between the Tamil diaspora and those back home.”90  Others disagree, noting that the 
“dichotomy of ‘insider-outsider’ seldom exists in the self-conception of the diaspora,” 
whose advocacy is driven both by the intransigence of the Sri Lankan state in addressing 
Tamil grievances and “the physical threat faced by their friends and families on the 
island.”91  As Vimalarajah and Cheran argue, “[t]o say that the Tamil Diaspora does not 
have to carry the costs of its long-distance politics … trivializes the pain and trauma of 
thousands of diaspora Tamils whose family members and relatives have perished in large 
numbers in the last few months of the war.”92 
Ultimately, theories of long-distance nationalism appear to place labels on 
diaspora behavior in the same vein as the lawfare critique, by deciding whether diaspora 
Tamils are peace-promoters, peace-wreckers, or something in between.  These labels tend 
to instrumentalize conflict-generated diasporas, suggesting that the international 
community engage with these groups when they moderate their demands and keep a 
distance when they do not.  This may ultimately hamper conflict transformation: 
Vimalarajah and Cheran assert that “[t]he classification of [diaspora] actors into extremist 
or moderate, into good or bad and into legitimate or illegitimate will not only contribute 
to a further polarization and marginalization but also close the door for any constructive 
engagement toward any sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.”93 
Diaspora Tamils have engaged in transnational advocacy long before 2009, and 
advocacy continues among second- and third-generation Tamils post-war.94  Given this 
fact, it may be more prudent to move past labels to assess why diaspora Tamil voices 
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differ and how they should be included within transitional justice processes.95  Section IV 
explores collective histories and memories that shape diaspora Tamil advocacy, and 
Section V explores various means by which the government of Sri Lanka could 
incorporate a diaspora component into transitional justice mechanisms to seek truth, 
provide redress, and pursue justice. 
 
IV. Unpacking Diaspora Calls for Justice 
 
Shared memories and histories shape modern narratives.  In the case of Sri 
Lanka’s diaspora Tamils, collective memories of violence, marginalization, and impunity 
shape current narratives for accountability, including among hardline diaspora groups. 
 
A. Transitional Justice and Identity (Re)construction 
 
In the 1980s, as Latin American dictatorships became democracies, the field of 
transitional justice developed as a set of judicial processes to address human rights 
violations during democratic transition from repressive regimes.96  Since then, the field 
has expanded broadly to encompass a holistic set of approaches to help achieve 
accountability, justice, and reconciliation following war crimes and massive human rights 
abuses.97  The United Nations has incorporated transitional justice in its post-conflict 
toolkit, defining it as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to 
ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”98  
Broadly speaking, transitional justice encompasses a justice process (to hold 
perpetrators accountable), a reparation process (to redress victims), a truth process (to 
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fully investigate what happened during the conflict and identify perpetrators and victims), 
and an institutional reform process (to ensure that atrocities do not happen again).  As 
stated by the Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice, “[a]n appropriate post-conflict 
justice strategy will reveal as much truth as possible; achieve as much reconciliation as is 
feasible; provide as full and complete reparations as are affordable; and, address past 
violence in an open, transparent, and truthful manner.”99  
The field of transitional justice has recently started to consider “fourth generation 
concerns,” including “the need to account for the underlying politics of transitional 
justice work, the need to balance local and international agency, and the need for greater 
economic justice.”100  One fourth-generation concern is how to address collective 
identities in formulating transitional justice processes: 
 
In order for [transnational justice] to deal adequately with the factors at 
work in conflicts with an identity dimension, it must first acknowledge 
and assess the relative weight of those factors in any particular context.  
Concretely, this means taking stock of the role that fear of domination, a 
pervasive sense of threat, ethnic entrepreneurs, dehumanizing myths and 
narratives, etc., played in the past and continue to play in the present.101 
 
Societies exposed to protracted violent conflict require more than the signing of a peace 
treaty—they “also require adjustments at a more fundamental psychological level.”102  “A 
generic inquiry that does not account for the varying experiences of specific sectors of the 
population cannot appropriately recognize victims, fully understand the abuses and 
violations that occurred, or make effective policy recommendations to prevent their 
recurrence.”103  At a minimum, “much more contextual analysis is needed—of nationalist 
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myths, of the role of elites, and of fault lines of mistrust, among other things—than is 
typically undertaken by transitional justice actors.”104  Put differently, reconciliation 
requires deeper introspection into the memories, identities, myths, and collective 
narratives that sustained the conflict.105 
Applied to the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, it is vital to understand the context of 
the ethnic conflict underlying Sri Lanka’s civil war, as diaspora Tamils view it, in order 
to understand why present-day diaspora narratives may take a certain tone.  Where the 
long distance nationalism and lawfare analyses fall short is in failing to look at the 
specific motivations underlying diaspora positions.  In so doing, these approaches fail to 
unearth the “experiences, vulnerability and hence the deprivation felt by those who live in 
the diaspora because of conflict” and thus “marginalize[] the actual human being who is 
the object of the study.”106  
Sri Lanka’s post-war Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) 
emphasized the need to “constructively engage those groups that still harbor adversarial 
attitudes and the LTTE approach of separation,” recommending that the government 
create  
 
[a multi-disciplinary task force] to propose a programme of action to 
harness the untapped potential of the expatriate community, and to 
respond to the concerns of the so-called ‘hostile diaspora groups,’ and to 
engage them constructively with the Government and other stakeholders 
involved in the reconciliation process.107  
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The LLRC noted the urgency of diaspora engagement: 
 
If such a comprehensive approach is not adopted urgently, the 
Commission feels that the current momentum towards creating a hostile 
external atmosphere could grow, and those groups that advocate such a 
process would continue to promote polarization that will significantly 
impair the genuine efforts of others who espouse reconciliation back home 
in Sri Lanka.108 
 
Scholars and commentators have echoed this call.109  
A first step in understanding the motivations behind diaspora advocacy is to 
investigate how diaspora Tamils view “the repercussions of exile on their lives, their 
paths and their histories.”110  There is a need to move beyond the “single narrative” and 
recognize diverse, if conflicting, stories.111  As Pragasam notes: 
 
[R]ather than just essentializing diaspora opinion and support for bellicose 
action based on functional ideas of coercion, hate or guilt, in a somewhat 
instrumental, reductionist and opportunistic sense, it is necessary to 
interrogate the existence and motivations of such communities within a 
more subjective, political, and historicized context.112  
 
The point of this inquiry is neither to elevate a diaspora Tamil narrative nor to subvert 
other narratives—in the same way that diaspora Tamils must be given a chance to tell 
their (diverse) stories, so too must Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese, Muslims, Christians, and other 
groups.  The goal instead is to explore how transitional justice processes will need to 
work at the individual level for individuals to transition from decades of conflict.   
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Ultimately, there may not be common ground among divergent actors on whether 
genocide occurred or whether Tamil Eelam is the desired end-game.  The truth-seeking 
component of transitional justice may ultimately reflect competing truths.  Still, without 
recognizing the role of collective memories and identities in shaping present diaspora 
narratives, it is unrealistic to expect groups to moderate their tone or to reconcile.  Calls 
for diaspora Tamils to condemn LTTE abuses or moderate their calls for Eelam113 may 
require members of the diaspora to revisit their constructed identities—no easy task.114 
 
B. Collective Memories and Identities Among Diaspora Tamils 
 
Researcher Nirad Pragasam interviewed dozens of Sri Lankan Tamils in London 
over the course of three years to understand their motivations and identity-perceptions.  
He found that for many, “the Sri Lanka they have ‘left behind,’ a Sri Lanka that they 
nonetheless ‘live within,’ is a place defined by the consequences of oppression, violence 
and conflict, a conflict that they themselves still feel presently engaged in and hence, it is 
a conflict that informs their sense of self on various levels.”115  Pragasam concluded that 
collective identity among diaspora Tamils was not merely shaped by the trauma of the 
past, but also by the present existentialist condition of being a member of the diaspora.116  
Likewise, a survey of diaspora Tamils in the U.K. revealed that “rather than creating a 
victim complex—although feelings of anger, grief, and frustration were mentioned—this 
feeling of being an oppressed people assisted in strengthening the will to resist and led to 
clear statements that to be ‘Tamil’ was to be ‘not Sri Lankan.’”117  Similarly, a health 
worker treating Tamil asylum seekers in London observed that the Tamils’ suffering 
continued after leaving Sri Lanka.118 
Pragasam found that Tamils he met had become radicalized both as a result of 
personal experiences of marginalization and victimization and as a result of frustration 
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that moderate Tamil leaders could not protect Tamils in Sri Lanka.119  Pragasam found 
that many he interviewed “viewed the LTTE as a necessary and acceptable evil in the 
face of a history of oppression, discrimination, human rights abuses, and war crimes.”120 
Sri Lanka at independence in 1948 was seen as a model for growth and 
development in the region.  The country experienced relative harmony among its ethnic 
communities.121  Almost 70 years later, Sri Lanka is marked by bitter ethnic polarization, 
increased authoritarianism, and diminished rule of law.122  This did not happen 
overnight—instead, a series of ethnocentric policies by the majority Sinhalese 
government were met with ruthless terrorism by the LTTE: 
• Sinhala replaced English as the country’s sole official language in 1956, forcing 
thousands of Tamils to resign from government service due to lack of fluency in 
Sinhala.  The 1972 Constitution further consolidated the ‘Sinhala Only’ policy, 
removing provisions that protected minorities from discrimination.123 
• Mass riots and state-sponsored pogroms targeting Tamil civilians occurred in 
1956, 1958, 1977, and 1983, causing a mass exodus of Tamils from the island.  
Nonviolent Tamil protests, including those led by Tamil politicians, were brutally 
suppressed.124 
• Successive Sri Lankan governments abrogated political agreements with Tamil 
leaders, causing many Tamils to lose faith in the political process.125 
• In the 1960s and 1970s, the government implemented standardization policies 
and quotas, restricting university admissions for Tamils.126  
• In 1979, the Sri Lankan government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
which allowed the police to arrest anyone suspected of terrorism for up to 18 
months without charge.  Many Tamils were arbitrarily detained under this 
controversial law, which remains in effect today.   
• In 1981, mobs burned the Jaffna Public Library, which housed rare Tamil 
manuscripts and held a place of cultural significance for the local Tamil 
community.127  
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• In July 1983, in response to the LTTE killing 13 soldiers, anti-Tamil riots broke 
out throughout the island.  The state did nothing to stop the looting and mayhem 
over a seven-day period now referred to as “Black July,” in which upwards of 
3,000 were killed and tens of thousands displaced.128 Two weeks before the riots, 
President Jayawardene told press: “I am not worried about the opinion of Jaffna 
people…now we cannot think of them, not about their lives or their opinion….  
the more you put pressure in the north, the happier the Sinhala people will be 
here….  Really if I starve the Tamils out, the Sinhala people will be happy.”129  
 
Jayawardene’s government did little in response to Black July, and waves of 
refugees fled to Tamil-dominated areas of the north and east and to India, the U.K., 
Canada, and other countries.130  After the 1983 riots, Tamil militant groups (not limited to 
the LTTE) suddenly swelled in recruits, as Tamils decided that the state would never 
protect them.  In response, the Sri Lankan government heavily militarized the north and 
east, and there was virtual impunity for torture, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and 
rape by Sri Lankan security forces.131  
The LLRC concluded that “the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lies 
in the failure of successive Governments to address the genuine grievances of the Tamil 
people.”132  As a consequence of their history, one quarter of Sri Lanka’s Tamils, 
numbering over one million today, fled their country as refugees.133  History—both 
personal and collective—shapes diaspora narratives: 
 
For every major account of atrocity in the public consciousness of the 
Tamil community, most Tamils also have a list of incidents ‘closer to 
home,’ within their own towns and villages, where they themselves or 
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their friends and relatives were exposed to the everyday violence of 
war.”134  
 
Pragasam explains that “[t]he Tamil diaspora was created in response to ethno-
nationalist policies of the Sri Lankan state—consequently, this is the frame though which 
diaspora members perceive current events.”135  Pragasam concludes that experiences with 
violence went beyond “a collection of brutal events” and formed “a psychological and 
existentialist landscape of violence which forced individuals to reconfigure the very 
manner in which they saw themselves”—experiences with violence “robbed them of their 
sense of self and sense of ‘home’, sending them into a journey of ‘exile’ while still in Sri 
Lanka itself.136 The very pursuit of “Eelam” (or separate Tamil statehood) by some 
diaspora Tamils reflects a search for “something to believe in, a subjective belief that 
shapes their own sense of identity, legitimacy as refugees from violence, coherence as a 
‘nation-in-exile’ and reality as part of a wider transnational Tamil community, striving 
for a sense of recognition, justice and dignity in the face of an oppressive ethno-
nationalist state.”137  
Sri Lanka’s former Defense Secretary advised those pressing for accountability to 
recognize that “past is past.”138  Yet, for many, including in the diaspora, the past is far 
from past.139  Interestingly, diaspora narratives continue to be shaped by historic 
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grievances like language polices, university admissions policies, and state sector hiring 
polices even as ground realities change.140 
This narrative is not the full story of Sri Lanka, nor the full story of the diverse 
Tamil diaspora.141  In its quest to become the sole representative of Sri Lankan Tamils, 
the LTTE killed moderate Tamil politicians and human rights defenders and eliminated 
rival militant groups.142  Tamils in LTTE-controlled areas “were frightened to talk in 
public spaces and as public people, for fear of being called a traitor and thus potentially 
arrested, taxed, or murdered by the LTTE, or of being taken for LTTE by the Sri Lankan 
army.”143  Many Tamils fled Sri Lanka to escape the LTTE’s reach only to find 
themselves silenced within diaspora communities.144  
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Successive Sri Lankan governments have advanced their own narrative, reducing 
the ethnic conflict to a war against terrorism.  “Triumphalist in its successful ‘war on 
terror,’ the government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa refused to acknowledge, let 
alone address, the Tamil minorities’ legitimate grievances against the state.”145  (The 
former President proclaimed after the war that there were no longer any minorities in Sri 
Lanka.146)  Using discourse analysis of major public speeches after the LTTE’s defeat, 
researcher Andi Schubert shows that the dominant state narrative “makes clear that over 
the past 30 years Sri Lanka has had to grapple with a terrorist problem rather than an 
ethnic conflict.”147  The government’s “discourse then seeks to affirm that this 
outside/invader [the LTTE] is both the problem and the cause of conflict in Sri Lanka.  
This is done through the flattening and simplification of the historical complexities of the 
conflict in Sri Lanka and limiting the conflict to the time during which the LTTE was in 
operation.”148 
The government’s narrative must be understood through the psyche of fear and, as 
with the diaspora narratives above, existential threat.  Ethnic Sinhalese and other 
communities lived in fear of LTTE suicide attacks, and army checkpoints became a 
routine part of going to school, work, or shopping.149  Parents would take different routes 
to reach the same destination so that if one parent died in an LTTE suicide blast, their 
children would not become orphans.150  Car bombs, train bombs, bus bombs, airport 
bombs, and checkpoints became the norm for civilians living outside the north and 
east.151  As a 2011 Defense Ministry report put it:  
 
The LTTE’s indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including the butchering 
of children, and its targeting of places of religious worship, made it clear 
that no one and nothing was safe from its violence.  This placed 
tremendous strain on ordinary life in Sri Lanka, causing incalculable 
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psychosocial harm to several generations of Sri Lankans of all ethnicities 
and disrupting civilian life.152 
 
A Sri Lankan citizen recalls feeling sheer panic in 2008 when a bus conductor in 
Colombo picked up a parcel that none of the passengers claimed.  Passengers pushed and 
panicked to get off the bus, fearing a bus bomb.  The parcel turned out to be an umbrella 
that someone had left by mistake, but the sheer panic of that moment underscored the 
collective trauma that many Sri Lankans felt.153  The end of the war came as a relief for 
many Sri Lankans.  Even those concerned about how the war was won hoped that its end 
would bring an unprecedented era of peace and unity.154 
There are still other narratives of violence and trauma in Sri Lanka.  Muslims 
have long been vulnerable, increasingly so in recent years.  In 1990, the LTTE ethnically 
cleansed Sri Lanka’s north of 80,000 Muslims.155  Norway’s omission of Muslims from 
the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement has been described as a “basic design flaw.”156  Today, 
Muslims again face persecution from militant Buddhist extremist groups.157  And in 1971 
and the late 1980s, the Sri Lankan government brutally crushed JVP insurrections led by 
economically marginalized Sinhalese youth.  Their hands full with JVP insurrections in 
the south and central parts of the country, the Sri Lankan government invited Indian 
peacekeeping forces to deal with emerging Tamil militancy in the north.  These Indian 
troops committed widespread abuses against Tamil civilians, none of which have been 
investigated or prosecuted.  Each of these stories shapes Sri Lanka’s collective memories 
of violence. 
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 “Reconciliation does not require writing a joint consensual history, but it may 
require admitting the other’s truth into one’s own narrative.”158  This would be a tall 
order in today’s polarized environment.  At the same time, failing to acknowledge 
different narratives—including those of one quarter of Sri Lanka’s Tamils who form the 
diaspora—could lead to further destabilization, placing meaningful reconciliation further 
from reach.  Opening the door to competing narratives, including those that challenge the 
single narrative of a “Humanitarian Operation” to defeat terrorism, could at least serve as 
a starting place to come to terms with the past and explore hopes for a shared future.159 
Post-war, despite the LLRC’s call for diaspora engagement, the Sri Lankan 
government has failed to take any meaningful steps toward constructive engagement.160  
More is needed for Sri Lanka to address its violent past and construct a shared future. 
 
V. Integrating Diaspora Narratives into a Transitional Justice Framework 
 
Diaspora calls for accountability reflect the collective identities and traumas that 
led one quarter of Sri Lanka’s Tamils to seek refuge abroad.  The question then becomes 
how diaspora narratives, including competing narratives within the Tamil diaspora, can 
be incorporated into Sri Lanka’s transitional justice framework.  This section outlines 
some possibilities and challenges in formulating mechanisms for truth, redress, and 
justice that reflect diaspora voices. 
Since Mahinda Rajapaksa was voted out of office in January 2015, the 
government of President Maithripala Sirisena has begun to make overtures to the 
diaspora community.  In a 2015 speech in Washington, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister 
stated, “we have already unofficially spoken … to a section of the diaspora in how they 
can engage in the process of rebuilding our country.  I take this opportunity again to 
invite the diaspora…all to come together to help Sri Lanka to move to a higher level of 
excellence, which it has yet to achieve.  So let’s all work together.”161  While positive, 
such statements are forward-looking and do not acknowledge diaspora Tamils’ rights as 
victims to truth and redress.  This section attempts to fill that gap, while noting 
challenges. 
At the outset, any transitional justice framework must involve extensive 
consultations and outreach with relevant stakeholders.  Consultations occur during the 
initial stages—through public workshops, focus groups, surveys, meetings, and release of 
key documents, practitioners refine mandates, create buy-in and legitimacy, and ensure 
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that victims’ voices are heard.162  Outreach occurs throughout the life of the transitional 
justice measure—through public hearings, media, and civil society outreach, practitioners 
communicate findings and progress to the general public and affected communities.163  
The Sri Lankan government should engage in close consultations and outreach with 
diaspora Tamils in designing and implementing transitional justice measures to address 
diverse diaspora narratives.164  This follows the LLRC’s recommendation that the 
government create a multi-disciplinary task force to harness diaspora actors in the 
reconciliation process.165   
It is a valid question to ask whether diaspora communities are relevant 
stakeholders: efforts to seek truth, promote redress, or pursue justice will require political 
dialogue and compromise among those in Sri Lanka, including Tamil parties, other 
political parties, victim communities in the former warzone, and Sri Lankan civil society 
groups.  Some might argue that while diaspora Tamils should contribute to Sri Lanka’s 
transitional justice processes, they are not stakeholders in negotiations to define the 
broader framework.  By contrast, some diaspora Tamils might suggest that the diaspora 
should play a prominent role in reaching a long-term political solution and negotiating 
the overall framework for transitional justice.   
While it is beyond the scope of this article to settle these complex issues, the goals 
of each specific transitional justice project may help define the scope and limits of 
diaspora engagement.  At its core, transitional justice aims at a whole range of goals, both 
individual and collective.  At the individual level, transitional justice processes seek to 
vindicate victims’ rights to truth, justice, and redress.166  Many diaspora Tamils are 
victims, in a legal sense, with rights to truth and redress under international law.  The 
Basic Principles and Guidelines define “victims” as  
 
persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical 
or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial 
impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that 
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constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.167  
 
Insofar as they fit this definition, diaspora Tamils should have standing as stakeholders to 
shape processes for truth, justice, and redress for the harms they incurred.   
However, transitional justice also aims at broader goals of reconciliation, non-
recurrence of violence, institutional reforms, and vetting and lustration of public officials, 
which reinforce longer-term possibilities for peace.168  Other stakeholders may have a 
stronger stake than diaspora Tamils to shape these broader objectives.  It may be possible 
to seek diaspora engagement for mechanisms that vindicate the rights of diaspora Tamils 
as victims to the ethnic conflict, without seeking engagement on other transitional justice 
processes.169  
Another threshold question involves sequencing: given the many transitional 
justice measures Sri Lanka will need to implement, initiatives to address historic 
grievances of diaspora Tamils may be lower priority than outstanding issues from the last 
stages of the war.  Resettling internally displaced peoples (IDPs), identifying detainees 
currently in custody, naming the disappeared, reforming the security apparatus, and 
resolving land ownership claims may be more immediate concerns for Sirisena’s 
administration.170  Moreover, transitional justice measures should not address diaspora 
grievances at the expense of grievances among in-country Tamils, Muslims, or the 
Sinhalese.   
Finally, in charting a transitional justice course, the Sri Lankan government 
should resist the urge to trade one measure of transitional justice for another—e.g., truth 
at the expense of justice.171  As the ICTJ explains: 
 
Without any truth-telling or reparation efforts, for example, punishing a 
small number of perpetrators can be viewed as a form of political revenge.  
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Truth-telling, in isolation from efforts to punish abusers and to make 
institutional reforms, can be viewed as nothing more than words.  
Reparations that are not linked to prosecutions or truth-telling may be 
perceived as “blood money”—an attempt to buy the silence or 
acquiescence of victims.  Similarly, reforming institutions without any 
attempt to satisfy victims’ legitimate expectations of justice, truth and 
reparation is not only ineffective from the standpoint of accountability, but 
unlikely to succeed in its own terms.172 
 
Thus, in a transitional justice processes to advance truth, redress and accountability 
should ideally proceed in parallel.  As discussed below, each could incorporate a diaspora 
component and vindicate the rights of diaspora Tamils to truth, justice, and redress. 
 
A. Truth 
 
Truth is a pillar of transitional justice: truth commissions, commissions of inquiry, 
and fact-finding missions advance the right of individuals to fully investigate what 
happened during the period of conflict and identify perpetrators and victims.   
 
[I]f societies are to prevent recurrences of past atrocities and to cleanse 
themselves of the corrosive enduring effects of massive injuries to 
individuals and whole groups, societies must understand—at the deepest 
possible levels—what occurred and why.  In order to come fully to terms 
with their brutal pasts, they must uncover, in precise detail, who did what 
to whom, and why, and under whose orders.173 
 
In Sri Lanka, emblematic events, including Black July, fail to register across 
ethnic divides.174  It was not until 2001 that then-President Chandrika Kumaratunga 
appointed a three-member truth commission to investigate ethnic violence between 1981 
and 1984.  The Commission failed to make any findings of prima facie culpability 
against any individual or recommend specific prosecutions, and Kumaratunga’s public 
apology in 2004 failed to identify those responsible or erase amnesties for 1980s-era 
abuses.175  Although the Commission made several recommendations to promote national 
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healing and highlighted the lasting effect of violence in shaping Tamil collective identity, 
Kumaratunga’s government failed to implement any recommendations, except issue 
compensation in selected cases.176 
Despite these shortcomings, during Kumaratunga’s presidency, diaspora Tamils 
helped negotiate a ceasefire agreement with the LTTE and contributed substantial funds 
to rebuild after the tsunami.177  Diaspora engagement during this period suggests that 
while identities are shaped by the past, diaspora Tamils may be willing to constructively 
engage with the government when transformation seems possible.  By the same token, 
when new abuses against Tamils occurred with impunity, past apologies appear negated, 
with old wounds reopened.178 
The Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence only covered the 1981-
1984 period, and the LLRC only covered events after 2002.  To date, no domestic 
mechanism has comprehensively examined the root causes of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, 
which preceded the civil war.  Similar to the Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence, the 
LLRC did not identify perpetrators or acknowledge state responsibility beyond vague or 
general expressions of remorse.179  Further, to date, no domestic commission has 
systematically engaged diaspora Tamils.180 
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With Sri Lanka’s defeat of the LTTE in 2009 and change in government in 2015, 
the country has an opportunity to start a genuine truth-seeking process to come to terms 
with the past.  A comprehensive truth-seeking process would consider events that led to 
the formation of Sri Lanka’s one-million-strong Tamil diaspora and collective traumas 
and identities shaped by those events.  The U.N. Principles on Impunity emphasize states’ 
duties toward victims and survivors to take measures “aimed at preserving the collective 
memory from extinction and, in particular, at guarding against the development of 
revisionist and negationist arguments.”181  Truth-seeking processes should help “secur[e] 
recognition of such parts of the truth as were formerly denied.”182  Consistent with these 
obligations, a truth-seeking mechanism in Sri Lanka should aim to address the collective 
identities and memories of diaspora Tamils.   
The Sri Lankan government—as opposed to civil society, human rights groups, or 
artists—stands in a unique position to facilitate such a truth-seeking process.  
Government initiatives can mainstream recognition of collective traumas in a way that 
civil society efforts cannot.183  Further, as the LLRC recognized: “the responsibility for 
being the prime mover of [any reconciliation] process lies squarely with the 
government.”184 
Liberia may provide a helpful model for integrating diaspora Tamil narratives into 
a truth-seeking process.  Recognizing the role of the Liberian diaspora in starting and 
fueling that country’s civil war, the 2006 Truth and Reconciliation Commission made 
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efforts to systematically engage the fractured Liberian diaspora in its truth seeking 
process.185  Commissioners signed a memorandum of understanding with a U.S. 
organization (The Advocates), which collected over 1500 testimonies and conducted 
hearings in eleven U.S. cities over a three-year period, in close consultation with Liberian 
TRC Commissioners.  This process gave diaspora members a chance to share stories, find 
common ground, and contribute recommendations.  In some cases, diaspora members 
were unwilling to be in the same room together, but the TRC was able to document these 
tensions formally and make recommendations for bridging divides.186  
Sri Lanka could likewise hold sittings and collect testimonies from diaspora 
Tamils in India, Canada, U.K. France, Germany, Australia, and the U.S.  These 
testimonies could aim to understand the causes of displacement and identify the (diverse) 
needs and priorities of diaspora Tamils.  This process would need to be part of a much 
broader truth seeking mechanism within Sri Lanka, which would capture perspectives 
from in-country Tamils, Sinhalese, and Muslims.   
Truth commissions are typically grounded in victims’ rights to information and 
redress.  Accordingly, it is valid to question diaspora Tamils’ standing as victims to 
participate in a truth-seeking process.  In the Liberian example, diaspora participants 
were either direct victims or indirect victims who had lost family members or 
experienced other effects of the conflict.187  In this situation, diaspora Tamils certainly 
have standing as direct or indirect victims to tell their own stories of loss or displacement 
and seek truth about the underlying root causes.  They may, however, lack standing to the 
extent a truth-seeking process is narrowly focused on the last stages of the civil war.   
A more difficult question is whether diaspora Tamils have standing to testify not 
only about their individual stories of loss and trauma but also about the political ideology 
with which they frame those harms.  Put differently, it is an open question whether truth 
commissions should apply an evenhanded human rights conception of victim/perpetrator 
to witness testimony instead of a more politicized or contextualized understanding.  Truth 
commissions have their moral foundations in providing public recognition for victims, to 
offer a space for them to tell their stories and thereby “reintegrate victims into the ‘speech 
community’ and [] reinstate their right to speak, and especially to be listened to.”188  But 
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can a diaspora Tamil testify about Eelam or genocide, or glorify the LTTE, in narrating 
his or her own story of loss? Some might say no.189 
However, it may be best to recognize victims as persons with political agency (not 
merely victims), without losing sight of guilt or responsibility.190  This point was made in 
connection with Peru’s truth commission.  By declaring neutral reparations for all victims 
of armed conflict, some claimed that Peru’s truth commission (CVR) stripped historical 
events of subjective context that would have revealed peasant self-defense groups as 
political actors with both strengths and limitations, deserving of both praise and blame.191  
The “lawfare” discussion would come full circle if diaspora Tamils were 
permitted to speak but censored on what to say.  Perhaps the best that a truth commission 
can do is to aim at a representative sample through active outreach within diaspora 
communities.  Sincere efforts should be made to avoid privileging elites in seeking 
diaspora narratives of conflict. 
Sri Lanka has a long history of commissions of inquiry with little to show for it 
(most reports remain unpublished).192  Many diaspora Tamils may view engagement with 
new processes as a futile charade.193  Before embarking on another truth seeking process 
(with or without diaspora involvement), the Sri Lankan government should release the 
reports of past commissions and commit to a transparent and credible process.  Departing 
from failed commissions in the past, the government should ensure independence, 
adequate resources, subpoena power, and witness protection for any truth-seeking 
process.  In addition, the terms of reference and mandate for any commission “should be 
based upon broad public consultations in which the views of victims and survivors 
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especially are sought.”194  These efforts would help build trust and facilitate constructive 
engagement with diaspora and in-country Tamils alike. 
Incorporating diaspora narratives in truth-seeking processes would be nothing 
short of a sea change.  Under former President Rajapaksa, the Sri Lankan government 
marginalized diaspora Tamils as the “LTTE rump.” Long term, diaspora narratives could 
help challenge the single narrative of the ethnic conflict.  Diaspora Tamil narratives of 
discrimination could be situated against Sinhalese narratives of fear and Muslim 
narratives of displacement.  Diverse narratives from within the diaspora community could 
debunk the notion that the Tamil diaspora is uniformly pro-LTTE. 
 
B. Reparations 
 
Reparations programs seek to redress past harms and ensure that harms will not 
recur.195  Reparations can include monetary compensation, return of land or property, 
official apologies, museums, memorials, education programs, psychological support, and 
creating days of commemoration.  A carefully designed reparations program could 
attempt to incorporate diaspora perspectives of the conflict. 
To date, only a handful of those affected by the civil war have received 
compensation from the government.196  The Sri Lankan government has not erected any 
public memorials to commemorate the 1983 riots or held any other emblematic events in 
the protracted ethnic conflict.  Nor are such events discussed in history textbooks issued 
by the Ministry of Education.197  By contrast, although reparations are severely lacking 
for Sinhalese victims of the JVP insurrections, the government did erect a memorial in 
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1997 for 33 students abducted and killed in Embilipitiya in the late 1980s.198  Without 
question, more could be done to redress victims on all sides of the ethnic conflict.   
In designing reparations programs, the Sri Lankan government could evaluate 
ways to recognize collective memories and redress collective harms of diaspora Tamils.   
For example, museums, memorials, and commemorations could explore root causes of 
displacement and violence and acknowledge state and LTTE responsibility for past 
harms.   Museums and memorials, however, should be careful to recognize past harms 
“in a way that does not demean the dignity of other groups” or “foment a sort of tit-for-tat 
escalation of competing symbols in the public sphere—which may reinforce a sense of 
group threat.”199  Careful curation could not only recognize collective traumas among 
diaspora Tamils but also break down monolithic notions of ethnicity.200  
Symbolic reparations might also track cultural notions of identity and loss, in 
particular, the longing for sonta ūr (ancestral village).201  Post-war, some diaspora Tamils 
have journeyed back to their sonta ūr; these “homecoming” journeys are emotional but 
potentially restorative and worth encouraging.202  One potential challenge is that complex 
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land rights issues could emerge, given decades of displacement.  Symbolic efforts 
directed solely at diaspora Tamils could also leave internally displaced Muslims feeling 
more marginalized.  As the ICTJ notes, tackling politically charged issues such as 
overlapping or competing land claims can lead to renewed tensions.203  Still, failing to 
address property and land issues could lead to further conflict,204 and symbolic 
homecoming efforts could help address collective traumas (across communities) formed 
by displacement and exile. 
Reparations not only redress past harm, “they also have a forward-looking goal of 
helping to rebuild society by affirming the status of victims as equal citizens in a new 
order that aspires to be not only more peaceful but also more legitimate, more 
democratic, more inclusive.”205  Yet, in seeking parity of status, reparations programs 
should consider whether to recognize the political agency of victim groups.  “[A] 
reparations project inspired by a desire to give victims recognition as equal citizens 
cannot systematically disregard the fact that different groups among the population might 
have a different experience of the violence.”206  Reparations programs structured to 
redress all victims of ethnic conflict, irrespective of ethnicity, political persuasion, or role 
in the war, may strip historical events of subjective context and fail to challenge the 
single narrative of conflict.207  At the same time, memorials and commemorations that 
consider victims as political actors should avoid privileging elite voices (or certain 
political viewpoints) within diaspora communities.   
Ultimately, any effort at memorialization or symbolic redress would reflect a 
significant change in diaspora engagement for the Sri Lankan government.   Last year, 
the Rajapaksa administration banned foreign passport holders from travel to the north and 
proscribed 424 individuals and 16 Tamil organizations as “terrorism” financers.208  These 
measures, taken years after the war’s end, should be reversed to credibly engage diaspora 
Tamils in any transitional justice process.  Early signs under President Sirisena are 
promising—days after the January 2015 elections, the new government scrapped the 
foreign travel ban, and its External Affairs Minister stated: “I have met some of the 
people in London whose groups were banned by the earlier government.  I do not believe 
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that they are terrorists.”209  However, proscriptions on specific diaspora groups and 
individuals currently remain in place. 
 
C. Justice 
 
Justice processes hold perpetrators individually accountable for serious violations 
of international human rights and humanitarian law, ensuring that those accused are tried 
in accordance with due process.  It has been suggested that criminal accountability also 
promotes reconciliation, by shifting blame from whole groups to individual 
perpetrators.210  In addition, trials may provide critical space to recognize and incorporate 
competing narratives of conflict, including diaspora Tamil narratives. 
Few studies discuss the impact of collective memories on criminal trials.211  Trials 
provide “a privileged site for conflicting accounts:” a courtroom can serve as a “‘theater 
of ideas,’ where large questions of collective memory and even national identity are 
engaged.”212  Ultimately, it may not be possible for criminal trials to “settle disputes 
about historical interpretation of recent events,” but trials may “go a long way in settling 
the factual basis of some events, so that discussions can then proceed over a shared 
understanding of what actually happened.”213 
Emblematic cases of violence against Tamils linger in collective memories and 
continue to shape diaspora views of the Sri Lankan state.214  Impunity likewise shapes 
collective memories.   Entrenched impunity has led many diaspora Tamils to lose trust in 
the state’s ability to provide justice, leading them to seek accountability in the 
international sphere.215  
The shared nature of memories and collective histories could prove helpful in 
developing justice mechanisms.  In contrast to truth commissions, criminal prosecutions 
consider a limited number of events, which may not reflect the full scope of harms 
perpetrated or experienced.  The few victims who are eligible to participate in criminal 
trials play supporting roles as witnesses, and they must limit their testimonies to the 
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offenses charged.216  However, criminal convictions have the potential to vindicate harms 
beyond those alleged in any specific case.  In the same way that impunity for emblematic 
cases shapes diaspora views, convictions of “big fish” for these emblematic cases may 
symbolically vindicate broader collective and individual memories of violence.217  The 
Sri Lankan government could investigate and prosecute state actors, paramilitaries, and 
LTTE leaders alleged to be most responsible for emblematic human rights abuses on all 
sides of the ethnic conflict.218  In cases where perpetrators are no longer alive, the state 
could publicly release archival evidence in its custody, issue apologies, and make 
reparations to victims who can establish a claim.   
The Sri Lankan government could start by creating an independent institution, 
with powers akin to those of a special prosecutor, to investigate emblematic cases on all 
sides of the ethnic conflict.  Past domestic commissions made this recommendation.   
Noting structural barriers to accountability, including conflicts of interest within the 
Attorney General’s department, the 1994 and 1998 Disappearances Commissions called 
for the creation of an “Independent Human Rights Prosecutor” in Sri Lanka, funded by 
Parliament and given the same independence as the elections commissioner.219  The 
LLRC likewise recommended an “independent institution” to address grievances “arising 
out of any executive or administrative act, particularly those based on ethnicity or 
religion.”220 
 If created, the Sri Lankan government should grant such an institution broad 
independence and subpoena powers to investigate and prosecute historic crimes.  The 
special prosecutor could start by investigating perpetrators identified by past 
commissions of inquiry.221  In seeking justice for diaspora Tamils, the independent 
prosecutor could prosecute historic cases alongside more recent abuses.  The independent 
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prosecutor could also engage directly with diaspora communities to investigate 
emblematic human rights cases.   For example, the office could set up a Victim’s Unit, 
similar to the one of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC),222 
with a diaspora liaison who could receive evidence from victims and witnesses within 
diaspora communities.   
To prosecute historic crimes, blanket amnesties may need to be revisited.  Under 
the Indemnity Laws currently in place, state officials and security forces are immune 
from any legal proceeding (civil or criminal) for actions “legal or otherwise” taken 
between August 1977 and December 1988 “with a view to restoring law and order,” if 
“done in good faith” by or at the direction of a Minister, Deputy Minister, or public 
servant.223  Likewise, the Prevention of Terrorism Act shields security personnel from 
civil or criminal liability for arbitrary detentions and other actions purported to be taken 
“in good faith” pursuant to the Act.224  These statutes were enacted to retroactively 
immunize all state actors from liability for unlawful conduct.  When enacted, these 
provisions were inconsistent with Sri Lanka’s then-existing obligations under 
international law to provide victims with “effective remedy,” including “the possibilities 
of judicial remedy.”225  Today, these blanket amnesties for torture and gross human rights 
violations are invalid under international law.226  An independent prosecutor could 
therefore argue that existing amnesty laws do not preclude prosecution of historic 
crimes.227 
Criminal trials, whether historic or recent, always carry political implications.  
Decisions about who to prosecute and for what crimes may be perceived as politically 
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motivated.228  In the case of Sri Lanka, prosecuting Army killings of surrendering LTTE 
cadres in 2009 may be received as more political than prosecutions for the denial of 
humanitarian aid or shelling of civilian targets.  Likewise, a decision to prosecute crimes 
against one community could be perceived as a whitewash of crimes committed against 
another.  To complicate matters, cases that are easier to establish in terms of liability 
evidence may be less politically palatable.  Resource constraints may require an 
independent prosecutor to make difficult choices about whether to first prosecute a 
member of the Army or the LTTE, and whether to prioritize historic versus more recent 
crimes.   
While there are no easy answers, it is worth considering how justice mechanisms 
in Sri Lanka could incorporate a diaspora component.  Prosecuting historic cases, for 
example, might provide diaspora Tamils with acknowledgement and recourse after 
decades of impunity. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Since the end of the civil war in May 2009, diaspora Tamils have been vocal 
proponents for accountability.  Some might label certain forms of diaspora advocacy as 
“lawfare” or “long-distance nationalism,” but such labels fail to account for the complex 
memories and history that may shape diaspora perspectives.  This article steps back to 
consider whether diaspora Tamil voices for accountability differ from mainstream human 
rights groups; why these differences may exist; and how diaspora voices might be 
incorporated within an inclusive transitional justice framework for Sri Lanka.   
With the change in government in January 2015, Sri Lanka has an opportunity to 
constructively engage with diaspora Tamils in formulating a transitional justice 
framework.  Diaspora narratives could be solicited in truth commissions, and symbolic 
reparations could seek to provide redress for shared memories of violence, 
marginalization, and exile.  Criminal trials could prosecute historic abuses alongside 
more recent crimes, providing victims in the diaspora with recourse after decades of 
impunity.  While this article does not recommend a particular course of action, there may 
be several ways in which the Sri Lankan government could seek to incorporate diverse 
diaspora narratives within an inclusive transitional justice framework for truth, redress, 
and justice. 
Doing so may present challenges.  One challenge is incorporating diaspora 
narratives without privileging diaspora elites: those who fled the LTTE may offer 
different narratives of conflict from those sympathetic to the LTTE.  Another deals with 
political aspects of diaspora engagement: in opening the door to diaspora narratives, it is 
not clear to what extent political views among diaspora Tamils regarding “genocide” or 
“Eelam” (statehood) should form part of the discussion.  Also, at a macro level, diaspora 
engagement may be lower priority among Sri Lanka’s many transitional justice 
challenges.   
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Even so, the recent change in government presents a historic opportunity for Sri 
Lanka to come to terms with the past.  Irrespective of sequencing and prioritization, 
diaspora engagement will need to be part Sri Lanka’s effort to come to terms with the 
past and look to a shared future.  As Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 
Commission recognized, failing to engage diaspora groups altogether could risk further 
polarization and put meaningful reconciliation farther from reach.229 
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